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1. European Bailout Plan 
The first wave of the global financial crisis 
consisted  of  a  deep  crisis  within  the 
international  banking  system  caused  by 
mortgage  contracts.  The  devastating  effects 
of  this  first  wave  were  only  delayed  -  not 
eliminated  -  by  states  interventions  through 
state bailouts given to banks in difficulty. To 
mitigate  the  effects  of  this  crisis,  the 
European  Bailout  Plan  was  passed  in  2008 
within  the  EU  Zone,  which  in  summary 
provided the following: 
- Any financial support had to be given on 
time and it was temporary; 
- Taxpayers interests had to be protected; 
-  Remaining  shareholders  had  to  deal  with 
governmental interventions; 
 -  Governments  were  free  to  change 
companies management when necessary; 
 -  Governments  were  entitled  to  changing 
banking wage policies; 
 - Stipulations relating to EU Bailout Plan had 
to be followed as stated; 
 - No secondary effects on other UE members 
were allowed. 
Besides  the  bailout  amount  of  1465  billion 
Euros,  the  EU  Bailout  Plan  also  stipulated 
that bailed banks could not give dividends to 
investors until the total amount received by 
them  was  returned  to  the  governments. 
Moreover,  governments  had  the  right  to  be 
represented on the board of directors of bailed 
banks by special observers. As a consequence 
of  the  above  stipulations,  European  stock 
markets fell the very next day this plan was 
approved. 
There  were  also  some  exceptions.  Many 
French  banks  like  Credit  Agricole  or  BNP 
Parisbas  refused  governmental  help  because 
of  its  interfering  role  in  bank  management. 
Other  banks  accepted  the  bailout  plan,  as 
following:  Barclay’s  (UK):  1.62  billion  £; 
Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  (UK):  5  billion  £; 
Fortis  (The  Netherlands/Belgium):  11.2 
billion €; Dexia (France/Belgium): 6.4 billion 
€; Hypo Real Estate (Germany): 35 billion €. 
This bailout given to banks by EU states was 
misunderstood by them, for several reasons, 
among which the following: 268 
- When banks know that the state will support 
them  during  crises,  they  can  afford  to  take 
bigger risks.  
- Without more regulation, banks are driven 
to  increase  their  returns  by  taking  bigger 
risks.  
 - When banks gain huge amounts of money, 
they keep the profits; when banks loose, it is 
the state that pays. 
Looking back, one can see that the European 
public has discovered an interesting fact: the 
2008-2009  fiscal  stimulus  programs,  which 
were  aimed  at  forestalling  an  even  greater 
crisis,  generated  more  debts  than  jobs.  By 
analyzing  this  situation,  one  conclusion 
arises: cheap money (through cost and high 
liquidity levels) has deepened the crisis. 
 
2. It’s all in the history 
Recent past history showed, on one hand, the 
financial  crisis  deepened  the  problems  of 
several  European  countries  because  of  the 
monetary and financial structures of the Euro 
zone. On the other hand, the crisis resulted in 
extreme  shortage  of  liquidity  for  European 
banks. During 2007-2008, banks of core Euro 
zone  countries  (Germany,  France,  The 
Netherlands, Belgium) continued to lend to 
peripheral  countries  (Italy,  Spain,  Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal). Gross cross-border claims 
from  core  to  periphery  reached  1.5  trillion 
Euros  in  2008,  representing  almost  three 
times the capital of core banks.  
The  European  Central  Bank  (ECB) 
intervened,  lending  freely  and  making  it 
possible for banks to start dealing with their 
weak  position.  Also,  the  ECB  reaction  was 
very  different  in  2009  when  states  were 
facing  growing  borrowing  needs  due  to  the 
crisis.  The  ECB  watched  as  interest  rates 
rose, financial institutions speculated against 
state  debt,  and  state  bankruptcy  raised  its 
head.  In  such  a  difficult  financial 
environment, the Euro zone left each state to 
defend itself in the financial markets. 
When looking closer at the above mentioned 
time  line,  the  following  can  be  stated:  The 
financial crisis has been followed by a wave 
of  governmental  defaults  on  public  debt 
obligations; The financial crisis has led to, or 
exacerbated, sharp economic downturns, low 
government  revenues,  widening  government 
deficits,  and  high  levels  of  debt,  pushing 
many governments into default; As recovery 
from  the  global  financial  crisis  begins,  the 
global recession endures, at some point to the 
threat  of  a  second  wave  of  the  crisis: 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
3. Sovereign debt crises  
In  a  financial  crisis,  government  spending 
increases  dramatically  in  the  attempt  to 
stabilize  the  financial  system  and  stimulate 
economic activity. Hence, tax revenues fall, 
fiscal surpluses turn into deficits and existing 
deficits  increase.  Because  of  the  difficult 
financial situation, all sixteen members of the 
European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  have 
violated  treaty  limits  on  allowable  budget 
deficits  (some  more  than  four  times). 
Moreover,  the  leading  economies  of  the 
world  have  all  seen  their  deficits  shoot 
higher, some to record levels.  
Among all the obstacles, there is a certainty: 
when economies are contracting or even grow 
slowly, bringing these deficits back down to 
earth, the situation turns into an unenviable 
challenge.  Governments  have  to  survive  by 
turning to the markets. Then those increased 
deficits turn into growing debt loads. When 
debt reaches 80 percent of the GDP threshold, 
the  borrowing  costs  for  governments  start 
ticking  higher  and  so  does  the  market 
scrutiny.  Related  to  this  topic  and  in  the 
attempt  to  warn  financial  markets,  the  IMF 
stated  in  2010  that  five  of  the  top  seven 
developed countries in the world would have 
debt  levels  exceeding  100  percent  of  GDP 
during the next four years.  
If  deficits  and  debts  rise  and  economic 
activity  appears  unlikely  to  solve  fiscal 
problems,  the  creditworthiness  of  the 
government  falls  under  intense  scrutiny. 
That’s when downgrades appear. This is the 
situation  many  countries  around  the  world 
had  to  face  in  2009  and  2010,  when  the 269 
sovereign  debt  crises  burst.  Greece’s 
sovereign debt rating has been downgraded to 
junk status. Spain has lost its AAA rating. UK 
could have lost its AAA status if its deficit 
would  not  have  been  addressed.  Across  the 
ocean,  Japan’s  outlook  has  been  cut  to 
negative  and  rating  agencies  have  even 
warned the U.S. 
In such an environment, when investors see 
more  risk,  they  require  more  return. 
Therefore,  the  borrowing  costs  for  troubled 
countries  rises.  Then,  it  becomes  harder  to 
finance spending needs and harder to finance 
existing debt. That’s when defaults show up. 
Unless governments can demonstrate they’re 
willing to take tough steps to reign in debt, 
crisis can spread quickly.  
 
4. Public deficit, nowadays problem in the 
EU 
Regarding the issue of the EU public deficit, 
it  must  be  stated  that  this  economic 
phenomenon  is  accepted  within  the  union 
until  it  exceeds  values  stated  in  documents 
like: Maastricht Treaty (1992); Stability and 
Growth Pact (1997). 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, countries 
have  to  meet  several  convergence  criteria, 
among which the following: 
- An inflation rate no more than 1.5% higher 
than the average of the three lowest inflation 
rates of EU member states over the previous 
year;  
- Long-term interest rates must not exceed by 
more than 2% the lowest inflation rates of EU 
countries over the previous year;  
-  The  Member  State  is  required  to  join  the 
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) for two 
consecutive  years  before  entering  the  Euro 
zone  and  it  should  not  have  devalued  its 
currency during the period;  
-  A  government  budget  deficit  must  not 
exceed 3% of each country’s GDP at the end 
of the preceding fiscal year;  
- A gross debt to GDP ratio must not exceed 
60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year. 
 
On the other hand, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (1997) provided: 
-  mechanisms  for  multilateral  surveillance 
and enforcement; 
-  stated  that  budgetary  positions  should 
normally be “close to balance or in surplus”; 
- if requirements are broken, EU can apply a 
fine of 0.5 % of the GDP to its members. 
To  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  two 
treaties, EU members had to impose a strict 
budget  discipline,  because  the  budget 
positions of some countries pose a risk for the 
sustainability of the public finances of these 
countries  and  of  the  European  Monetary 
Union  (EMU)  as  a  whole.  Moreover,  the 
national fiscal policies of EU members were 
strictly subordinated to the inflation target of 
the European Central Bank. Also, the national 
governments  were  obliged  to  meet  rigid 
parameters and could not use fiscal policies 
freely to increase growth and employment. 
Nevertheless,  since  the  financial  meltdown 
has begun, 20 EU countries (among which all 
16 of the EMU’s members) have been guilty 
of excessive spending. During all this period, 
European  governments  were  and  still  are 
struggling to rein in deficits after the worst 
downturn  since  World  War  II.  The  table 
below  presents  some  data  concerning  the 
amount of deficits: 
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Table no. 1 Budgetary Deficit/GDP 
 
COUNTRY   2007   2008  2009  
Ireland   0.1  -7.3  -14.3 
Greece   -5.1  -7.7  -13.6 
United Kingdom  -2.8  -4.9  -11.5 
Spain   1.9  -4.1  -11.2 
Portugal   -2.6  -2.8  -9.4 
Iceland   5.4  -13.5  -9.1 
Latvia   -0.3  -4.1  -9 
Lithuania   -1  -3.3  -8.9 
Romania   -2.5  -5.4  -8.3 
France   -2.7  -3.3   -7.5  
Netherlands   0.2  0.7  -5.3 
Hungary   -5  -3.8  -4 
Bulgaria   0.1  1.8  -3.9 
Malta   -2.2  -4.5  -3.8 
Source: Eurostat data 
 
As it can be seen, twenty member countries 
are facing EU deadlines to get their budgets 
back in shape. They are all deemed crucial to 
economic  stability  and  growth  as  the  EU 
claws back from recession. A review of the 
situation  in  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and 
Malta  shows  all  four  countries  have  taken 
adequate steps to narrow their deficits. There 
are  requests  that  Malta  and  Lithuania  are 
granted another 1 and 2 years to get back in 
shape.  
Most  analysts  stated  that  in  2010 
unemployment rate in the EU would reach the 
level of 10.25% and the public deficit would 
be  7.5%  of  EU  GDP.  In  2009  budget 
shortfalls of two or three times the EU limit 
would  have  been  unthinkable  in  most 
countries.  Because  many  countries  have 
exceeding  deficits,  the  EU  Commission 
proposed deadlines to reduce gaps. Here are 
some examples: 
- Hungary met its 2009 deficit target of 3.9% 
of GDP. It has until 2011 to bring its deficit 
below 3%.  
- Latvia ended 2009 with a deficit projected 
at just below 10% of GDP, as recommended 
by the EU. The target for 2010 was 8.5%.  
-  13  countries  were  given  2-5  years  to 
reinstate  fiscal  discipline:  Italy,  Belgium 
(until  2012);  Germany,  France,  Spain, 
Austria, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Portugal  (until  2013); 
Ireland (until 2014); UK (until 2014-2015). 
The  significant  indicator  for  any  country  is 
Gross  Debt  to  GDP  Ratio,  which  has 
deteriorated  strongly  due  to  recession, 
stimulus,  capital  injection  in  banks,  and 
reached  dangerous  levels  in  2010  for  the 
balance of European economies, as it follows: 
Greece  115%;  Italy  116%;  Belgium  97.2%; 
UK  78.7%;  Portugal  77.4%,  France  76.1%; 
Germany  72.1%;  Austria  69.1%;  Ireland 
64%,  Finland  41.3%.  Many  analysts  think 
that the problem in today’s Europe is due to a 
natural  evolution  of  things  and  that  the 
evolution of the financial crisis follows this 
pattern:  over  indebtedness was  shifted  from 
home buyers on to banks, then transferred to 
governments  (e.g.  the  recent  sovereign  debt 271 
crisis in Greece is only a natural development 
of things).  
To  prevent  amplification  of  budgetary 
problems and their propagation in the EU, the 
27 EU states have to reduce public deficit and 
have  received  guidelines  from  the  EU  to 
achieve this goal within 2011-2014.  
 
5. The situation of Greece, “Achilles Heel 
of the EU” 
Greece has accumulated high levels of debt 
during  the  decade  before  the  crisis,  when 
capital  markets  were  highly  liquid.  As  the 
crisis has unfolded, and capital markets have 
become more illiquid, Greece may no longer 
be  able  to  roll  over  its  maturing  debt 
obligations. Some analysts have discussed the 
possibility  of  a  Greek  default.  Greece  has 
relied  heavily  on  external  financing  for 
funding  the  budget. Between  2001,  when  it 
adopted the euro as its currency, and 2008, 
Greece’s  reported  budget  deficits  averaged 
5%  per  year,  compared  to  a  Euro-zone 
average  of  2%.  Its  current  account  deficits 
averaged 9% per year, compared to a Euro-
zone average of 1%.  
The causes of financial crisis in Greece can 
be grouped into two categories, namely: 
- Domestic causes: high government spending 
of  successive  Greek  governments;  weak 
revenue  collection;  structural  rigidities  in 
Greece’s economy.  
-  International  causes:  access  to  capital  at 
low  interest  rates  after  adopting  the  Euro; 
weak  enforcement  of  EU  rules  concerning 
debt and deficit ceilings facilitated Greece’s 
ability to accumulate high levels of external 
debt. 
To prevent the entry of Greece into collapse, 
Euro-zone  countries  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  seeking  to  halt  a  widening 
European debt crisis that has threatened the 
stability of the Euro, agreed to extend Greece 
an unprecedented €110 billion ($147 billion) 
rescue  in  return  for  Draconian  budget  cuts. 
Germany, whose population has been deeply 
sceptical of a bailout, beared the largest share 
of the Euro-zone contribution, namely €22.3 
billion  of  the  total  amount.  The  Euro-zone 
loans  carry  an  interest  rate  of  about  5%, 
compared  to  about  3%  for  the  IMF 
contribution.  Some  €10  billion  will  be  set 
aside as “bank stabilization” fund for use if 
the  condition  of Greek  financial  institutions 
worsens. 
The Greek government has promised to slash 
and then freeze public sector wages, raise sin 
taxes,  increase  value-added  taxes,  impose  a 
new  levy  on  businesses,  cut  pension 
payments  and  increase  retirement  ages  for 
some  public-sector  workers.  The  steps  are 
expected to save the state €30 billion through 
2013.  Thus,  the  Greek  government  has 
adopted the following measures: 
- Public sector limit of €1,000 introduced to 
bi-annual bonus, abolished entirely for those 
earning over €3,000 a month; 
- An 8% cut on public sector allowances and 
a  3%  pay  cut  for  DEKO  (public  sector 
utilities) employees; 
-  Limit of €800 per month to 13
th and 14
th 
monthly  pension  instalments;  abolished  for 
pensioners receiving over €2,500 a month; 
- Return of a special tax on high pensions; 
- Changes concerning laws governing lay-offs 
and overtime payment; 
-  Extraordinary  taxes  imposed  on  company 
profits; 
- Increases in VAT to 23%, 11% and 5.5%.  
-  10%  rise  in  luxury  taxes  and  taxes  on 
alcohol, cigarettes, and fuel;  
-  Equalization  of  men  and  women  pension 
age limits;  
- General pension age has not been changed, 
but a mechanism has been introduced to scale 
them to life expectancy changes; 
-  Average  retirement  age  for  public  sector 
workers has increased from 61 to 65;  
-  Public-owned  companies  to  be  reduced 
from 6,000 to 2,000. 
Only  the  nearest  future  will  show  whether 
these  harsh  methods  have  generated  the 
appropriate results. 
 
6.  Broader  implications  of  Greece  crisis: 
Spillover Effect 